The White House has published its "Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography," pursuant to legislative requirements and National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10). The document sets out the U.S. national approach to transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and plays a pivotal role in laying the strategic groundwork for future cryptographic standards.

Overview and Purpose of the Report

The report outlines several key points:

1. It provides a detailed description of the U.S. strategy for shifting to PQC, highlighting the anticipated challenges and strategies to overcome them.
2. It presents an estimate of the financial resources required for the transition, suggesting a proactive allocation of funding.
3. It summarizes progress made to date, primarily under the auspices of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Significant Insights and Estimates

• The report estimates the development of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) as likely to occur in the 2030s. This aligns with the broader consensus within the scientific community and underscores the urgency of preparing for the quantum computational threat.
• It acknowledges the dual nature of quantum computing as both a powerful tool and a significant threat. The U.S. government recognizes the need to both foster the development of quantum computing technologies to sustain a competitive global edge, and to fortify defenses against potential quantum threats.

Strategic Migration Plan to PQC

The transition strategy includes several crucial components:

• A thorough, continuous cryptographic inventory. Because public-key cryptography is so pervasively integrated across systems, this inventory needs regular updates through both automated and manual methods.
• Early action against "record-now, decrypt-later" attacks. The potential for adversaries to harvest encrypted data today makes it essential to begin the transition to PQC well before a CRQC becomes operational.
• Prioritization of systems and data. Agencies are directed to prioritize which systems and data sets transition to PQC first — including high-impact information systems, high-value assets, and other systems housing data expected to remain sensitive through 2035, or those using asymmetric encryption methods like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
• Early identification of systems that can't support PQC. These systems must be identified early to plan their replacement or upgrade and avoid delays in migration. The report notes that replacing these systems will account for a significant portion of the total estimated cost.

Financial Implications and Further Observations

The projected total cost for the government-wide transition between 2025 and 2035 is approximately $7.1 billion (in 2024 dollars). This figure is presented as an initial estimate, subject to adjustment as more precise information becomes available. It's important to note that this budget does not cover National Security Systems. The scale of this budget underscores the importance of strategic investment in technology updates and robust management of technology obsolescence.

Conclusion

This report is not only a significant blueprint for advancing U.S. cryptographic capabilities, but also a critical step in safeguarding national security in the quantum age. The insights it provides — particularly the substantial budget earmarked for this transition — underscore the scale of the task ahead. For companies outside the government sphere, this report is a useful reminder of the importance of regular technology updates and renovations. Identifying and planning for the obsolescence of systems that can't be upgraded to PQC is essential, as is revising procurement policies to ensure future readiness for PQC.

Further reading:

• The full White House Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PDF)